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Abstract This paper discusses the conditions under which post-Soviet states succeed
in fighting corruption. The method of paired comparison of most similar cases, Estonia
and Latvia on the one hand and Georgia and Armenia on the other, is used to tease out
the variables that vary within and across pairs and produce divergence. It is argued that
young, and structurally and ideologically cohesive, groups in power that are antago-
nistically predisposed toward the former colonial patron and free from the influence of
the old guard are more likely to reform while enduring political-economic networks
undermine anti-corruption reform.
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Introduction
In the literature on political transitions it has been argued that some post-
transition countries may become trapped in a ‘gray zone’ when ‘transitions
get stuck’ [1, 2]. Similarly, empirical evidence suggests that countries often get
stuck in vicious cycles of malfeasance and corruption 1 despite economic
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where a public official (A), acting in ways that violate the rules and norms of office, and that involve personal,
partisan or sectional gain, harms the interests of the public (B) (or some sub-section there-of) who is the
designated beneficiary of that office, to benefit themselves and/or a third party (C) who rewards or otherwise
incentivises A to gain access to goods or services they would not otherwise obtain. This definition is most
comprehensive because it accommodates often-overlooked issues such as influence trading, systems of
patronage, the use of legal means to deliver favours and illegal funding to groups rather than individuals that
can indirectly lead to private gain (Yadav 2011). Also, it does not exclude the acts that are not restricted by the
legislation such as state capture.
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transformations or political developments. Strikingly, besides a few notable exceptions
cases of highly corrupt countries becoming less corrupt are rarely observed [3]. Two of
these contemporary anti-corruption achievers, Estonia and Georgia, are located in post-
Soviet Eurasia - both of which have demonstrated remarkable transition from highly
corrupt regimes to less corrupt environments. This paper looks at these success stories
and compares them with their neighbours that failed to reform to the same extent.
The question ‘under what conditions post-Soviet states implement anti-corruption
reform?’ is most interesting to explore in countries that resemble one another on a
number of political and economic indicators but differ in the extent to which they have
pursued anti-corruption policies. In particular, this paper asks why countries that
demonstrate so much similarity - Estonia and Latvia on the one hand, Georgia and
Armenia on the other - pursued anti-corruption agendas with different levels of rigour
and commitment, which hence explains why they significantly differ on corruption
scales? The method of paired comparison of most-similar cases allows for the control-
ling of a number of variables [4] that usually affect levels of corruption. This includes
political systems or the degree of democracy/authoritarianism [5], political and eco-
nomic competition (Schumpeter, Washington Consensus), colonial heritage and age of
democracy [6], institutional legacy [7], the existence of natural and mineral resources
[8] and size of the country [9]. The case selection also controls for economic capacity,
prospects for European Union accession, and international trade openness that some
researchers argue are crucial in explaining diverging outcomes in corruption levels
across Eastern Europe [10].2
By gaining variation on the dependent variable (anti-corruption reform) the paper
teases out two elite-level independent variables that vary within and across the pairs
and produce divergence: these are a radical break with the past and political elite
cohesiveness. The goal of this paper is to give more depth and detail on this variation
and the way in which different extents of break with the past and elite cohesiveness are
affecting corruption. Even though this paper sheds some light on how these two factors
affect corruption levels, this paper’s ambition is mainly to provide avenues for hypoth-
esis building regarding causal pathways.
First I outline the puzzle and establish that there is variation in corruption levels in
respective pairs of countries in the specific periods under study. Second, I look at the
extent to which the transition resulted in a radical break with the past and how the
extent of this break affected corruption levels. Third, I look at political elite cohesive-
ness and explain how this cohesiveness varied and how it impacted anti-corruption
policies. I conclude by elaborating on the findings of the comparison within as well as
across the Baltic and Caucasian pairs.
Puzzle
The two cases in the Baltics (Estonia and Latvia) and the two in the Caucasus (Georgia
and Armenia) demonstrate a striking similarity in a number of aspects. Historically and
religiously, even culturally, Estonia and Latvia bear a strong resemblance to each other,
2 Mungiu-Pippidi [11] provides detailed description of how and why various structural and institutional factors
matter for the control of corruption.
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while Lithuania deviates. Estonia and Latvia share a religion (Lutheran), common
historic heritage (of being suppressed under a number of foreign rulers for many
centuries), and experience of being part of the Tsarist Empire, independence in the
Inter-war period and Soviet invasion in 1940. During the USSR they were regarded as
the ‘Soviet West.’ Nowadays Estonia and Latvia are both members of the EU with
burgeoning economies and pluralistic democratic systems (Table 1).
Similarly Armenia and Georgia share a history of invasions and having experienced
being part of the Tsarist Empire and then the Soviet Union. Both have been a
battleground for expanding empires including the Romans, the Persians and the
Ottomans. Their languages are different, as are their alphabets, but in both cultures
the allegiance to Christianity provided a way to sustain identity with both countries
having a strong sense of being small nations that survived difficult conditions. Both
ethnic identities remained strong throughout Soviet times despite Russian assimilation
policies, with the table below summarising some of the similarities (Table 2).
Hence the two Baltic and two South Caucasian neighbours demonstrate great
resemblance in a number of political and socio-economic aspects and the path of state
formation. However the countries diverge on corruption indicators. Estonia is a distin-
guished achiever and excels regionally and internationally while Latvia still faces
corruption problems and is more corrupt than its neighbours. Since 2004 Georgia has
implemented major anti-corruption reforms in the field of public governance, has cut
red tape dramatically and reformed its criminal justice system although Armenia
remains largely un-reformed and relatively more corrupt than its northern neighbour
(Chart 1). The chart below demonstrates the variation.
The variation in the Baltic cases dates back to the first years of the post-Soviet era3
and hence I focus on the early and mid-1990s in order to figure out the direction of
causal arrows. Even though the Baltic States had similar starting points they adopted
different policies in the early 1990s that resulted in divergent paths of development.
Estonia was quickly regarded as a success story [13] and the prospect of EU member-
ship in the late 1990s stimulated greater convergence with other EU member states
thereafter ([14] p.9). The starting point in the Caucasus was much different. Georgia
and Armenia had a reputation for being the most corrupt republics in the Soviet Union
as opposed to the Baltic countries where corruption levels had been much lower even in
Soviet times, with much of the illegal practices having survived the aftermath of the
Soviet breakup. Armenia was never a reformer despite differing corruption levels in the
1990s. An important moment of divergence happened after Georgia became the ‘anti-
3 The victimisation surveys that identify the percentage of the respondents who actually experienced corrup-
tion is an useful tool to quantify the variation in corruption levels. Chatterjee and Ray [12] use International
Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) to come up with the ‘bribe rates’ that is the number of bribe victims divided by
the number of respondents. The victimisation is based on the individual’s response to the question: [During the
past year] has any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer or inspector in your own
country, asked you or expected you to pay a bribe for his services? The data shows striking variation between
Estonia and Latvia. In 1995 the bribe rate for Estonia is 0.036 as opposed to Latvian score of 0.126 and in
1999 the rate for Estonia is 0.051 compared to Latvian rate of 0.136. Further, DEMSTAR survey provides
evidence to further quantify the variation. According to the survey (semi-structured interviews conducted face-
to-face interviews in 2000–2002) of the high-ranking administrators and politicians holding office in the 1990s
in Estonia and Latvia, 28 percent of Estonian respondents agreed that misuse of state position was common in
Estonian politics and 70 percent disagreed. This needs to be contrasted to 72.5 percent of Latvian elite reported
the misuse of status and 25.5 percent denying it.
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corruption achiever’ after its Rose Revolution and hence I concentrate on this process
unfolding from 2003 onwards. 4 The Rose Revolution in Georgia is an obvious
intervening variable, a critical juncture that provided a window of opportunity for the
new political elite but this is not self-explanatory because similar ‘revolutions’ led to
dire consequences in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine where new governments
largely failed on the anti-corruption front [17]. There are a number of factors that made
the Rose Revolution a breaking point in fighting corruption and I focus on those
variables instead. In Georgia a group of young reformers led by US-educated lawyer
Mikheil Saakashvili launched radical reform and had soon been credited by the World
Bank’s’s [18] Doing Business report as a top reformer. In contrast Armenia experienced
only superficial reform and success against corruption has also been limited.
Independent variables and causal mechanisms
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the incentive structure of Georgian and
Estonian elites relating to why they chose to fight corruption rather than benefit from it.
The thinking of political elites about the reform especially its pace and depth was
important since in both cases there was a shared understanding in top leadership that
window of opportunity was short and the change had to be as fast and as radical as
possible ([19]. Hereby I will not seek to account for these ‘causal beliefs’ ([20],
pp.27–29) but I rather take the willing and committed leadership as given and look at
the conditions under which this willingness and commitment led to the reform. The
elites in other post-Soviet countries, for example in post-Maidan Ukraine could have
also capitalized on window of opportunity and invest their political capital in fighting
corruption. Moreover, there are some indications that the certain members of
4 According to CRRC [15] survey 6 % of the Armenian respondents report paying bribe over the last 12
months compared to 0 % in Georgia. The international crime victimization surveys of 2010 and 2011 indicate
that Georgia shows one of the best results in Europe - only 0.2 % of the population mentioned that one or more
officials had asked them to pay a bribe in the course of last year, down from 16.8 % in 2000 and 3.5 in 2004/5
[16]. EBRD surveys further triangulate the variation.In Georgia the percentage of the firms indicating
corruption as a major constraint decreased from 41.0 % in 2002 to 23.6 % in 2005 and to 20.4 % in 2008.
Armenia demonstrates the reverse trend – the same figure increased from 15.3 % in 2002 to 21.4 % in 2005
and to 39.6 % in 2009.
Table 1 Characteristics of Baltic pair
Estonia Latvia
Democracy (Freedom house 1998) Free Free
Population (mill.) 1992 1.57 2.67
Per capita GNP at purchasing power parity (1989 USD) 8900 8550
Ethnic composition (1989) 61 % Estonian 52 % Latvian




governing elite of post-Maidan Ukraine are willing to change the corrupt system but
they have been failing so far due to surviving power of oligarchs and lack of elite
homogeneity [21, 22].
In cases of Estonia and Georgia we are looking at the transition away from
particularistic regimes that is defined as ‘ a mode of social organization characterized
by the regular distribution of public goods on a nonuniversalistic basis that mirrors the
vicious distribution of power within such societies’ ([23], p.87). This condition of
affairs is referred as ‘patrimonialism’ by Weber [24], ‘limited access order’ by NWW
(2009) and ‘extractive institutions’ by Acemoglu et al. [25]. However none of these
authors provide clear insights regarding the conditions under which the transition is
possible.The logic implied in Acemoglu and Robinson as well as in NWW is that most
of these transitions rests on one crucial factor - the empowering of larger segment of
society that leads to more inclusive institutions. Ironically this does not necessarily
apply to post-Soviet achievers. In their phases of radical reform Estonia systematically
excluded ethnic Russians and both Georgia and Estonia excluded Communist time
networks and most of the ranks of previous government. In both cases one can observe
a closely-knit group of only a handful of reformers rather than broad coalition of
different groups.
I focus on two inter-related independent variables: radical break with the past and
elite cohesiveness. A leadership that is not constrained by organised interests has a
better chance of bringing change. The success of some authoritarian states in fighting
corruption has been partially explained by elite homogeneity. As Scott [26, 27] has
argued historically corruption under cohesive elites (early Ayub Khan period in Paki-
stan, early Naser Egypt, early Ataturk Turkey) were relatively low compared to
Table 2 Characteristics of Caucasus pair
Armenia Georgia
Democracy (Freedom house 2013) Partly free Partly free
GDP per capita 2008–2012 (US$) 3338 3508
Ethnic homogeneity 90 % Armenian 84 % Georgian
Large reserves of natural resources (oil, gas, etc) No No
Langauge Armenian Georgian
Religion Christian Apostolic Christian Orthodox
Chart 1 Control of corruption, worldwide governance indicator, World Bank. For full information about the index see
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf>. The index aims to capture not only perceptions of the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, but also the degree
of state capture by elites and private interests. The index aggregatesmeasurements by transparent methodology and it
has been credited widely as reliable
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fragmented elite structures (post-war Thailand, early Stuart England, Ethiopia, Iran and
Morocco in 1970s). Some researchers have convincingly shown that more heteroge-
neous states perform poorly in terms of quality of government [28–30]. One root of the
link between fractionalization/heterogeneity and corruption can be intra-governing elite
fragmentation that leads to infighting and turf wars and undermines the government
efficiency. Homogeneity may also neutralise the so-called ‘spoiler trap’ because of ‘the
spoilers’ limited access to power and hence a lack of opportunity to oppose
reform. This is commensurate with the literature on ‘Weak Government Hy-
pothesis’ [31–34] that argues that fragmented governments are less effective at
responding to challenges, and that fractionalization decreases their decision-
making capabilities. Timothy Frye (2010) in his seminal book Building States
and Markets after Communism argues that the degree of political polarization,
defined as the policy distance on economic issues between the executive and
the largest opposition faction in the parliament helped set the pace and consis-
tency of reform in the post-communist era. Frye sides with the earlier work of
other scholars who argued that nomenclature elites are interested in dysfunc-
tional states or ‘partial reform equilibrium’ that would maximize the concen-
tration of rent to themselves [35].
This is inherently linked with the potential need for break with the past that
would allow meaningful reform to happen ([36], p. 12). Libman and Obydenkova
[37] show that Russian regions where the share of communists was larger in the
Soviet period were also much more corrupt twenty years after the collapse of the
USSR. This can be partially explained by the survival of representatives of the
ancien régime in power. Arguably counter-elites that are less beholden by the
remnants of a previous regime have better chances to reform [38]. A radical break
with the past allows less politically-polarised entities to emerge that reform faster
(Frye 2010) and reduces the number of veto players that may block reforms
[39, 40].
Here is the casual pathway for each of the independent variables: first, ‘non-
pacted’ political transitions 5 (2003 Rose Revolution in Georgian case and
transition in the aftermath of Soviet breakup in Estonian case) produced radical
changeover of governing elites.6 This changeover also meant the breakdown of the
collusive links between the state and the business. Elite reshuffle and breakdown
of state-business nexus dramatically decreased the influence of old guard in post-
transition milieu and hence neutralised its capacity to undermine reforms. The
unrestrained leadership was able to deliver. Second, elite cohesiveness caused
little intra-elite polarization, hence political leadership having consensus on major
goals acted efficiently and could implement reform.
5 Even though it is debated whether Georgia has transitioned to universalistic and democratic governance
regime [41] it remains to be the case of greatest positive transformation in corruption control since the
existence of measurement indices [42].
6 Pacts are accords between incumbents of the regime and the counter-elites/political opposition that, while not
obstructing regime change, assure the continued and significant influence of past rulers and elites after regime
change. The old guard survivors with their attitudes and competencies and the networks of solidarity existing
among them, would undermine the new regime and its reform endeavours if they were allowed access to
important political and administrative positions [43].
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These independent variables are related with each other. Before taking power the
counter-elites in Estonia and Georgia were a closely-knit group of individuals
established under the strong belligerence to the existing regimes and this was a reason
why they excluded most of the old guard from governance structures once they
prevailed. On the other hand, the nature of transformation, that is revolutionary
transition in both cases of Estonia and Georgia, allowed the counter-elites to fully
consolidate power without the negotiated pact with the ancien regime. A break with the
past was possible because the new elite was cohesive, while the radical nature of that
break gave the elite that was behind it an incentive to cohere. The dependent variable
here is the anti-corruption reform. The reform in Estonia and Georgia was ‘Big Bang’
type of all-encompassing reform that implied transformative change in all spheres of
public governance while in Latvia and Armenia the reform was very limited, if any.
Hence we are looking at broader public sector reform rather than an isolated anti-
corruption policy only. In fact there is no anti-corruption policy that would effectively
address the problem but rather the transformative change in political economy is
required [44]. This essay will now try and explain this variation.
Explaining divergence - enduring networks vs. radical break with the past
This section will demonstrate the degree to which the old guard influences politics in
the post-transition period, which has varied in Estonia compared to Latvia and in
Georgia compared to Armenia. It will further show that unrestrained leadership was
much more efficient in implementing anti-corruption policies while the influence of the
old guard has undermined reform efforts.
In Estonia reforms had already been lunched by the Savisaar government in 1991.
The flagship policy of the government was price liberalisation reform but the govern-
ment was weak enough to succumb to some pressures from various lobby groups that
led, for instance, to the softening of agricultural reform. Tiit Vähi’s government
followed up with easing bureaucracy, implementing currency reform, lifting various
regulations and liberalising trade. However the Vähi government harboured a number
of officials with a more traditional socialist outlook and Vähi and his team favoured the
notion of a third way between capitalism and socialism [45].
The role of former top and middle level communist officials in the Estonian political
leadership at the end of 1991 was quite significant [46, 47]; however this had changed
with the first post-communist parliamentary elections in 1992 and the nomination of
32 years old Mart Laar as prime minister. The elections were won by the right wing Pro
Patria party that got 29 out of 101 seats. Pro patria has become the leading force in
governing coalition established with two other political parties. Importantly the coali-
tion had only one vote majority [48] and unlike the Georgian case described below
Laar’s government had to work hard to push the legislation through the Parliament.
The party elite supported radical marketisation and Westernisation of Estonia’s
economy. The Estonian leadership viewed the fight against corruption through pro-
moting market economy reforms and deregulation, and by also cutting ties with the
country’s Soviet past [49, 50]. The radical overhaul of bureaucracy was implemented
that brought mainly new and young people in government institutions [51]. Laar [49]
recalls in his memoirs that it would have been impossible for the old appratchiki to
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adapt to new requirements: ‘People who have based their entire career not on honest
work but on lies and deceit, it is unrealistic to expect them to change… the old system
can only transplant corruption’.
Radical reforms started immediately after Laar’s election - flat rate was introduced,
large scale privatisation launched, and import and export tariffs were drastically
reduced [52]. The number of ministries decreased by one third and their staff and
functions rationalised. Some institutions like county councils, where Soviet
nomeklatura held especially strong positions, were abolished [53]. The government
eliminated subsidies, cheap loans and other such privileges that could be obtained
through bribery of public officials. The Estonian government widely used external
expertise partly because of a fear that more experienced local cadres could sabotage
reform initiatives [54]. Estonia passed a radical policy towards Soviet era judiciary,
replacing most of it and starting practically anew with new magistrates trained within a
matter of a few months [55]. The de-facto lustration, which took place almost imme-
diately after independence and the lustration law in 1995, eliminated the influence of
the old guard while in Latvia these efforts had been much more fragmented, and
according to some researchers [56] the Soviet secret police, the KGB, had infiltrated
a number of new structures post-independence in politics and the economy.
In contrast to Estonia’s experience, Latvian reforms advanced very slowly with
much confusion and a lack of cohesiveness. Monetary reforms and a liberalisation
of prices were successful but as discussed below privatisation policies had its
drawbacks and the country’s dated industries were slow to adopt. For instance,
many of the civil servants from the old system retained their posts (Nørgaard 1999
p. 78). Between March 1990 and June 1993 two individuals dominated politics in
Latvia: Anatolis Gorbunovs, the Supreme Council Chair and ex-ideological sec-
retary of the Latvian Communist Party, and Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis. These
two individuals were among the core of the new political party, the Latvian Way,
which won a relative majority of seats (36 out of 100) in the first post-communist
parliamentary elections in 1993. Individuals like Gorbunovs was said to have
helped the old elite in the new system [57]. Sixty-eight percent of Latvian MPs in
the early 1990s had previous membership in the Soviet Communist Party com-
pared to 24 % of Estonian parliament members [58], which suggests a greater
break with the past in the case of Estonia.
Due to the survival of old elites in power the state-business nexus was more
entrenched in the case of Latvia, than in Estonia. Soviet industrialization policies also
played a role that put an emphasis on developing light industry in Estonia (textile,
woods and food processing) and heavy industry in Latvia (machine building, metal
working, electrical and electronics). As a result Estonia had 40 out of 300 enterprises
that were Moscow-controlled all-union enterprises while Latvia had 140 out of 400 of
the same type (Nørgaard 1999, pp. 124–126).7 The predominance of heavy industry in
Latvia, that was more loyal to outside influence, generated powerful interest groups that
opposed liberal market reforms. These enterprise managers pursued their own ends in
7 Papava 2009, [59]. Some of the incoming elites have held positions under Shevardnadze (so-called
‘reformist wing’ in late 1990s) but they’ve never been allowed to play an important governance role. Most
of the key decision-makers in Saakashvili’s inner circle has been recruited either abroad or among younger
people in non-governmental sector.
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the transition period of 1989–91 when the control fromMoscow has been declining and
local authorities did not consolidate power yet [60]. The neoliberal policies in Estonia
in 1992–94 meant that non-competitive Soviet enterprises could not continue to
function, which in turn allowed for a fast restructuring of the economy.
In Latvia the survival of many communist elites in power allowed the apparatchik-
cum-entrepreneurs to capitalise on their previous links to establish corrupt relationships
with the state. The dominance of the older cadres in the economy meant the survival of
old personal networks and unwritten rules of corruption from the Soviet era. More than
60 % of Latvian private businesses reported having contacts every month or more often
with members of parliament compared to only 9 % in Estonia ([58], p. 122). Norgaard
and Hansen [61] showed that the actors outside the state played a large role in Latvian
politics, in particular in the area of economics and finance. Several ministers reported
that informal structures outside the state play a crucial role in decision-making. The
impact of businesses on Estonian politics was never that substantial. For instance,
Laar‘s neoliberal government did not require additional lobbying efforts because its
ideology was already crafted to support businesses (Huang 2002) while powerful
interest groups had been locked out the inner reform cycles - one of the key determi-
nants of Estonia’s success [62]. Pro Patria lacked links with local businesses partially
because the party was assisted by Western partner parties which provided support
through training and possibly the money for the campaign (Muuli 2012). Laar’s
government also refused to hand out subsidies to the businesses that was another
important policy aspect that decreased opportunities for corruption [51].
The lack of influence of the old guard and the breakdown of collusive links between
the state and the business allowed the Estonian government to implement a cohesive,
transparent and disciplined process of privatisation under the control of one central
agency that differed from the poorly-organised, opaque and unclear institutional frame-
work in Latvia [14, 46, 60, 63]. In Latvia privatization decisions were initially left up to
the branch ministries and municipal governments before the establishment of a
centralised agency in 1994. This created corrupt opportunity structures and unlashed
a ‘grabbing hand’ of entrenched economic bureaucracy ([58, 64], p. 115). After more
than three years the Latvian government was still vacillating about the method; what
would be targeted for acquisition, who would manage the process and what would be
needed for acquisition [65]. Despite the stricter regulations in the mid-1990s, insiders
already had enough time to benefit - 50 % of industry had already passed into private
hands when the privatization process became more regulated ([63], Nørgaard 1999
p.146–147). As such, the delayed privatization process allowed old nomenclature
networks to regain control over the economy [62].
Interestingly some of the dynamics between Estonia and Latvia have been replicated
between Georgia and Armenia. The significant divergence in corruption levels between
Armenia and Georgia took place after the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia. In fact the
degree to which corrupt networks have been entrenched in the two countries explains
the occurrence of revolution in Georgia and the failure of anti-government protests to
oust the regime in Armenia. Former Armenian presidents Levon Ter-Petrosian (Pres-
ident of Armenia in 1991–1998) and Robert Kocharian (President of Armenia in 1998–
2008) both managed to reign in these interest groups to their own political and material
advantage; however former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze (1995–2003)
failed to do so and this erosion of power in Georgia was one of the key factors that
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accounts for the success of the counter-elites in the Rose Revolution [66]. The ‘alliance
of convenience’ between militaries, major businessmen and regional political leaders
was strong in Armenia and so was the perception that their interests would be
threatened if Robert Kocharian would be overthrown (Iskandarian 2004).
The Rose Revolution reshuffled the governing elite in Georgia. Mikheil Saakashvili
got 96.3 % of the presidential votes in 2004 and his political party United National
Movement (UNM) obtained a constitutional majority in parliament. The incoming
elites seemingly decided to capitalise on their popular mandate to implement some
painful reforms. The political transition was not the outcome of negotiated pacts with
the old guard unlike Ukraine where the reform momentum after the Orange Revolution
(2005) was undermined by the ‘spoiler trap.’ The absence of significant influence of the
old guard alongside a large margin of legitimacy coupled with a zeal to transform
Georgia away from ‘post-Sovietness’ made it possible to implement wide sweeping
reforms. Unlike Estonia where anti-corruption policy was a corollary of market build-
ing, in Georgia the anti-corruption policy was an integral part of Saakashvili’s state-
building project. In Georgia new anti-corruption legislation, a zero-tolerance policy to
crime, and reforms of key institutions central to combating corruption, such as the
police force and prosecutor’s office.8
In November 2003, from the very beginning of his rule, President Mikheil
Saakashvili made it clear that building efficient state institutions was his priority, as
he duly initiated sweeping public sector reform. Saakashvili’s team demonstrated an
impressive level of dedication and commitment. There was a large overhaul of staff in
public institutions. Overall the number of public sector employees dropped by almost
50 % while the salaries of the remaining civil servants increased roughly 15-fold. Some
government institutions and/or procedures that had been generating illicit rents were
cancelled, which included an anti-monopoly agency, food security agency, and techni-
cal check-up of cars. This was supplanted by general economic liberalisation policies
that reduced red tape and eliminated opportunities for bribery [68]. As a consequence,
corruption was substantially reduced in sectors where citizens interacted with the state
most frequently, including policing, registering property, licensing businesses, and tax
administration. However the Saakashvili government faced continuous criticism of
‘elite level’ corruption - some of this corruption was detected; during 2003–10, about
1000 public officials faced charges of corruption, including six members of parliament
and 15 deputy ministers, according to Georgia’s Ministry of Justice.
Armenia chose the path of ‘evolution’ rather than revolution but reforms lacked
sustainability and took place on the eve of elections or in their immediate
aftermath [69]. Most of the government’s anti-corruption work is invested in
drafting strategic documents and legal acts that are rarely implemented [70].
Success against corruption has been marginal even though work has been done
for the sake of simplifying licensing procedures, business regulations, and admin-
istration of tax and customs. Many corrupt officials have been sacked in the tax
department, customs service and police; however personnel changeover has lacked con-
sistency and thoroughness and hence has been regarded as merely symbolic [71–73]). In
8 The percentage of Latvia’s contribution to gross industrial output of USSR in the field of engineering and
metallurgy amounted to 29.4 percent in the late 1980s compared to 14.9 percent of Estonia’s contribution
([67], p.14)
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November 2012 an address to the Cabinet President Tigran Sargysyan admitted failure in
the struggle against corruption and announced intention to employ more surgical methods
against corruption [74].
Similar to the Estonia-Latvia comparison, the state-business nexus is much more
entrenched in Armenia than in Georgia. Initially the incoming elites in Georgia were
only peripherally related with large businesses and had only one or two financiers; for
example natural gas trader David Bezhuashvili. Most of the licit and illicit economic
resources were monopolised by members of the Shevardnadze family [59]. Hence
incoming elites were less beholden by economic interests in the period during which
most radical reform took place (2004–2007). The parliament elected in 2004 mostly
consisted of young activists from National Movement and only a few businessmen
could be found among the ruling UNM (United National Movement) faction.
However this changed as re-privatisation proceeded and as new incumbents
developed vested interest. Re-privatisation destroyed the old oligarchic class but
developed a new type of interest groups that either maintained close links to the
incumbents or were part of the ruling team. The key indication of the vested
interest and ‘elite corruption’ was the transformation of some members of the
political elite into Georgia’s wealthiest individuals [75]. The government is be-
lieved to have awarded public contracts to ‘friendly’ companies, in exchange for
political support. The owners of the same companies would be found among key
financial contributors to the ruling UNM [76, 77]. Even though corrupt practices
at the higher levels had been perfected and old interest groups had been replaced
by new ones, petty corruption had been drastically reduced.
In Armenia corrupt networks were largely endured throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
Hence a window of opportunity never emerged. After President Ter Petrosian lost
power in 1998 due to the revolt of his inner cycle two subsequent presidents, Kocharian
and Sargisian, became keen to co-opt powerful interest groups in order to hold on to
power (Navasardyan 2012). The need to co-opt vested interests result in reforms facing
constraints since breaking such vicious cycles is difficult because of tightly-knit
networks that are interested in keeping the status quo. In 2009 Prime Minister Tigran
Sarkisian complained that the existing system would not allow for the exposing and
punishing of officials who maintained extensive and illegal business interests [78].
The post-Soviet practice of securing and developing businesses through informal,
and sometimes illicit, deals produced corrupt networks of politicians, entrepreneurs and
criminals that completely blurred the public-private dichotomy in the early 1990s. The
early privatisation policies resulted in the concentration of nearly all of Armenia’s
national wealth in the hands of 45–50 families that now control 54–70% of the country’s
national wealth (UNDP 2001, [79]). This was exacerbated by the corrupt interest of
government officials at national and local levels that acquired direct, partial or indirect
control over emerging private firms [80, 81]. In early 2000s the average age of an
oligarch in Armenia was 50 years old, with the youngest being 48, which indicates that
most of these wealthy individuals are carryovers from the communist past [82].
The business sector is organised into several informal commodity-based cartels and
semi-monopolies in specific economic sectors or geographic regions. This is especially
true for trade in commodities, like sugar, flour and alcoholic beverages (Nranyan 2012,
[78]). These individuals enjoy parliamentary immunity and ‘represent a convergence
between corporate, state, and in some cases even criminal interests’ [78]. Some
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oligarchs have openly spoken about their use of elected office for safeguarding business
against actual or potential political pressure9.
Oligarchs have helped political authorities to rig elections and suppress opposition.
The involvement of their bodyguards in bullying opposition politicians, voters and
journalists has been widely reported during elections [84]. In return for political
support, Ter-Petrosian and Robert Kocharian allowed the economic elite to enter formal
politics. The 2003 parliamentary and 2005 municipal elections welcomed dozens of
wealthy individuals with connections to the Kocharian government into the national
parliament and local administrations [85, 86]. The proportion of entrepreneurs grew
from the mid-1990s, of which one-third were MPs during the period 2003–7 [87].
In sum, a radical break with the past was significant in Estonia and Georgia while a
continuity of entrenched networks can be observed in Latvia and Armenia. The absence
of ‘spoilers’ in the reform process facilitated fast and efficient anti-corruption policies
in Estonia and Georgia while the surviving corrupt networks have helped keep the
status-quo and undermine reform in Latvia and Armenia.
Explaining divergence - elite cohesiveness vs. elite fragmentation
The extent of elite cohesiveness is another crucial factor that varies within and across
the two pairs. This section will show that the structural and ideological cohesiveness of
political elites was crucial for a high degree of consensus on development goals and
organisation within the new authorities. This cohesiveness then significantly contrib-
uted to the overall efficiency of government policies especially in the field of anti-
corruption10.
In Soviet times nationally-oriented, indigenous elites were purged in Estonia and
Latvia. In 1959 the older cadres and central leadership in Moscow eliminated younger
Latvian leaders in the Central Committee that were subsequently replaced by Russians
and Moscow-loyal Latvians. This accentuated Russian domination as well as destroyed
more nationally-oriented political elites. Similar purges had already expelled native
elites in Estonia in 1949–1952 (Krumins 1990; [89, 90], pp. 99–100), which had longer
term implications. For instance, by the late 1980s, ethnic Estonians held 82.2 % of
administrative managerial posts while ethnic Latvians held 63.1 % [91].
The crucial difference between Estonian and Latvia elites in the period under
scrutiny is elite cohesion. Steen [58] found very close integration among Estonian
elites to which he refers a ‘tribe feeling.’ As DEMSTAR surveys of Baltic elites show
acting and former ministers in Estonia demonstrate a greater trust in one another
compared to their Latvian counterparts [61] that suggest more elite cohesiveness in
Estonia. Unlike Estonia more-heterogeneous Latvia lacked consensually-unified elites
9 Backhaus [83] documents a similar outcome in the former German Democratic Republic. The emerging
business networks could keep close informal ties to the former communist members in the bureaucracy and
political elite, leading to higher corruption.
10 Saakashvili was inspired by economic model of Singapore and his role models were strongmen/state-
builders Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Charles de Gaulle rather than democratisers Vaclav Havel or Thomas
Jefferson [89]. While Laar [49] was inspired by Ronald Regan’s ‘Reaganomics’, Lescek Balcerowicz’s shock
therapy in Poland, Margaret Thatcher’s reforms and Milton Fridman’s writings on neoliberalism.
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and had first to establish a kind of platform for coordinated national actions that was
known as Club 21 in the late 1980s, which later formed the basis of the major political
party, Latvian Way.
Mart Laar’s team was a group of young liberal intellectuals. Laar, a former history
teacher, was a radical with clear views on general policy priorities [92]. Laar’s team had
roots in embryonic civil society of Soviet times that formed in 1985–87 around issues
of protecting the environment and cultural heritage and displayed a large degree of
ideological homogeneity [52]. Inspired by neo-liberal market reforms elsewhere Laar
put an emphasis on the importance of big-bang approach that aims to replace a planned
economy with a market economy in a single burst of reforms or reform ‘in one breath’
as he puts it. Laar claims that his team’s youth and simple pro-market zeal was crucial
to its success [49]. Indeed the Estonian ruling elite was much younger compared to its
Latvian counterpart. The Estonian Minister of Defense Indrek Kannik was 28 and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs Juri Luik was just 27. This generational change touched
general ranks of the bureaucracy - in 1994, 23 % of government employees were aged
22–34 compared to only 10 % in Latvia (Steen 1994). In Estonia and Georgia younger
elites were important in achieving the political sea change, which would take place.
‘Maybe I was too young’Mart Laar said in an interview recently, ‘but maybe, because I
was so young, I was just crazy enough to dare.’11 Younger staff frequently lacked
experience but had the motivation, new ideas and alternative visions, which were
significant assets in having a positive impact on the efficiency of government institu-
tions. Youth mattered greatly as it acted as a measure to the extent to which individuals
were still captives of the Soviet past. Age can also be related with strategic time
horizons when younger leaders are more interested in curbing corruption for the sake
of ‘establishing the brand name’ and having a safer exit strategy (Manow 2005). More
research however is needed on causal mechanisms on how the age of elites can
influence anti-corruption policies.
In contrast to Estonia, the Latvian political elite in the early 1990s was an amalgam
of young career seekers, members of the Latvian diaspora and old nomenclature
members [93, 94] and hence was rather an electoral platform lacking an ideological
profile, unlike its Estonian counterpart Pro Patria. The role of émigré Latvians drasti-
cally decreased among the party leadership partially because these individuals were not
considered as insiders by the former Soviet nomenclature ([95], p 68).
Successful reform effort in Estonia hence was led by a structurally- and ideologi-
cally-cohesive, integrated, and young political elite lacking a communist background.
This guaranteed consensus over goals and a high degree of organisation within the elite
increased government efficiency. As a result the Estonian government demonstrated a
striking capacity to manage the transition process, including responding to the chal-
lenges of privatisation as described above, drafting new legislation, etc. For example a
1995 EBRD transition report scores the effectiveness of legal rules in Estonia at four
(out of five) compared to two for Latvia [96]. Efficiency was undermined in Latvia by
the heterogeneous elites with Soviet nomenclature hangovers and a lack of ideological
unity and intra-elite trust.
Similar to Estonia, there was a generational change in Georgian ruling elites. Many
members of Saakashvili’s team had had a civil society background - for instance
11 See interview with Ruben Hayrapetyan in Nouvelles d’Arménie (#188, September 2012).
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Interior Minister Ivane Merabishvili, Secretary of the Security Council Giga Bokeria
and Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava. Like Laar’s government, the core of the team in
Georgia demonstrated a high degree of ideological coherence rooted in neoliberal
ideology with strong right-wing and market-friendly elements [97, 98]. Saakashvili
was only 37 years old when he took office and many of his cabinet members were in
their late 20s or early 30s. Furthermore, the government succeeded in attracting young
educated personnel in middle and lower level of bureaucracy with competitive salaries.
Many of these young bureaucrats were highly motivated, full of new ideas and, more
importantly, zealously committed to institutional integrity [99]. In Armenia under Serzh
Sargysyan (post-2008) some young people under their 40s had been hired in govern-
ment structures especially in the presidential administration, central bank, and the
ministries of justice, finance, economy and education. According to International Crisis
Group [100], Sargysian wanted to distinguish himself from previous governments as a
reformist. However ‘young reformers’ is not a cohesive group, and the notion had been
increasingly at odds with the old guard and oligarchs. This process of recruit-
ment of Westernised young people was met with fierce opposition of
entrenched interest groups that largely perceived it as a threat to the dominant
informal system (Navasardyan 2012).
In contrast to Georgia, Armenia has been ruled by a group of individuals who had
made their careers in the ranks of the young communists (Komsomol) and had hailed
from the ‘Karabakh clan.’ The two presidents, Kocharian and Sargisian, were both
from Nagorny-Karabakh, formally Azerbaijani territory under Armenian control.12 The
impact of the Karabakh conflict over the formation of Armenia’s political class is
important. Unlike Georgia that had been defeated twice in the 1990s in ethnic conflicts,
which took place in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Armenian state had to reward its
national heroes who gained reputation and prestige during the conflict. Many former
leaders of armed movements obtained key government position in law enforcement and
other structures as well as lucrative shares in various business sectors ([101],
Navasardyan 2012). The origins of some of the contemporary oligarchic structures
can be traced back to the ‘power ministries’ during the conflict especially the Ministry
of Defence and Ministry of Interior [79]. Traditionally the heads of power ministries
have been the key actors in distribution of spoils ([102], Stefes 2006). Most importantly
these ministries, especially the defence sector, dominated by older officers have
remained most resistant to any internal reform perceived as undermining the power
of the old guard [103]. These conflict dynamics have crystallised the dominance of
political and military leaders of the Karabakh movement, ‘corporate body of veterans’
in Iskandaryan’s [104] terms, over the formal state in Armenia.
12 Historically corruption under cohesive elites, as in early Ayub Khan in Pakistan, early Naser Egypt, and
early Ataturk Turkey were relatively low compared to fragmented elite structures as in post-war Thailand,
early Stuart England, Ethiopia, Iran and Morocco in the 1970s ([27], p. 87). Among the contemporary
achievers there are several countries that display either a one-party dominance system or a large extent of
elite homogeneity. This partially explains the relative success of the authoritarian countries like Singapore,
Rwanda, Qatar or Saudi Arabia where the nature of their political systems determine elite cohesiveness. In
more democratic settings as in Botswana, low levels of corruption were partially explained by the absence of
vested interests that could block the implementation of policies pursued by the regime (Taylor 2002, Eriksen
2011).
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Georgia experienced a radical elite changeover that brought to power a new
generation of young leaders committed to an idea of building a strong state with low
corruption levels while in Armenia significant elite continuity is observed. The neolib-
eral agenda of political elites has played an important role in Estonia and Georgia
especially in terms of cutting bureaucracy and simplifying the business environment.
Importantly, apart from neoliberal agenda, the Estonian and Georgian elite also
differed from their respective neighbours in terms of their attitudes toward their former
colonial patron Russia. This was a significant driver in terms of forging elite cohesive-
ness in these countries, providing incentive to diverge from ‘Sovietness’ or ‘post-
Sovietness’ [that often implied having a resemblance to Russia] and cleaning up the
criminal justice system due to the perceived threat of foreign influence. Some re-
searchers have argued that in Estonia the consensus over the main aims of transition
was achieved largely because of a general fear and actual threat from Russia to restore
its rule (Sootla G. and Lääne S. 2013). This resulted in more integrated national elites in
Estonia compared to in Latvia, which was less homogenous. The 2004 Baltic Barom-
eter population survey revealed that 39 % of ethnic Latvians thought Russia posed no
threat compared to only 10 % of ethnic Estonians (Rose 2005). In Latvia the ethnic
Latvian and ethnic Russian populations were more integrated that further undermined
the possibility of homogenous political elite. Twelve percent of Latvian elites were
married to ethnic Russians while none of the spouses of the elites in either the Estonian
parliament, bureaucracy or judiciary were Russian in the early 1990s ([58], pp. 48–51).
In Estonia a stronger emphasis was put on getting away from ‘Soviet-ness’. Similar to
Georgian case Russia as an ‘anti-model’ played a crucial role. In a recent interview
Mart Laar [48] said ‘we learnt what not to do by looking at Russia.’
Similarly Georgian elites’ cohesiveness and drive away from post-Sovietness was
significantly delineated by antagonism toward Russia. Saakashvili reiterated several
times that the Georgian leadership was building an ‘alternative governance model in
post-Soviet Eurasia,’ meaning a government marked by low levels of corruption, in
contrast to the way Russia functions (Civil Georgia 2008, [105]). Concerns about the
co-optation of Georgian security forces established strong incentives to crack down on
corruption in law enforcement structures and partially delineated a major clean-up in
the Georgian police and security forces (Light 2013, Slade 2013). In contrast, Armenia
is politically and economically more dependent on Russia and its elite are not in full
agreement on the need to get away from its former colonial patron. The study of
Armenian elites [87] reveals only a slight difference among those who prefer EU
integration (26 %) and those who prefer integration with Russia and CIS countries
(22.5 %) while the absolute majority of the respondents from Georgian political parties
interviewed in 2010 looked positively at EU integration [106]. One crucial implication
is that there is no external push to change anything in the way the Armenian govern-
ment runs the country (Stefes 2009) while the experience of Central/Southeastern
Europe suggests that close ties with Europe provide a means and motivation for EU
democratic conditionality that in turn makes political systems more transparent and
accountable [107].
However this is not to say that international environment is more important than
domestic agency. Russian leverage and linkage does not have much explanatory power
beyond being an ‘anti-model’ that is motivating [or not] local leaders to reform. For
example in terms of economic leverage - Georgia hosts many large-scale Russian
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investment projects as does Armenia. Estonia had pragmatic and cooperative view
towards Russian investment from the very beginning compared to Latvia where less
liberal economic ideology fuelled resistance to selling national companies to the
foreigners. Russian investors owned most of the port and terminal infrastructure in
Estonia already from the 1990s but the deals have been transparent compared to
Latvian experience where privatisation of gas industry involving Russian actors was
notoriously corrupt [108]. This indicates that internal conditions have more significance
and delineate the behaviour of external actors.
In the same token, the emulation of Scandinavian model in Estonia and some impact
of American model and various European models on Georgia is clear enough however
the impact of EU and international conditionality on reform process is often over-
estimated [109]. Indeed Estonia had stronger linguistic ties with Finland and the
possibility to watch Finnish television in Soviet times and regular ferry connections
bringing Finnish tourists provided Estonians with a window towards Europe which was
denied to the Latvians ([94], Björkman 2002). Estonians had bigger diaspora in Sweden
(30,000 have Estonian roots compared to only 5000 Latvians) that promoted greater
links with Finland and Sweden during transition period (Nørgaard 1999). This also
promoted more ‘Nordic identity’ of Estonia and political elites often emphasised that
‘Estonia is a Nordic country.’ In the 1990s top Latvian diplomats came up with the idea
of ‘Amber Gateway’ for the Baltics emphasising Latvian view of the more autonomous
Baltic region that was somewhat at odds with close alignment of Estonia with Finland
([95], p.131). This had some impact during the transition process in the form of
investment, exchange of ideas and normative diffusion [51]. However Estonian lead-
ership had its own strong views on reform that was frequently not commensurate with
the viewpoint of international advisors. In a recent interviewMart Laar [48] emphasizes
that his team was not listening much to Western advise.
In the same token in Georgia the models of emulation have been diverse with confusing
and contradicting references to Estonia, Singapore, Switzerland and a host of European
countries [110]. Government officials would often go against the advice of international
institutions and advisors. Interviews with some decision-makers suggest that the advice of
European experts often emphasised a more moderate approach while the authorities had
been in favour of quick and radical action. For example, the mass dismissals in 2003 were
undertaken against Western counsel (Burakova 2011). European experts ‘mainly wanted us
to write plans and strategies’ said Shota Utiashvili, former official of the Interior Ministry in
an interview and ‘strongly favoured slow pace of reform.’13 KakhaBendukidze the author of
libertarian reforms was widely reported to dismiss most of the recommendations of
international advisors including USAID and IMF [111].
To summarise young and consensually- and structurally-coherent political elites in
Estonia and Georgia have managed to implement efficient anti-corruption policies
while less coherent elites in Latvia and Armenia have been less effective in reform
endeavours. The success in both cases of Georgian and Estonia is determined mainly
by domestic agency and not external factors (see also [11], p. 205).14
13 Estonia’s Mart Laar: Just do it-and as quickly as possible, interview with Mart Laar, AntiCorrp.
14 Armenia fought Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno Karabakh in 1991–94 and won the conflict. Since
then the conflict is frozen and the territory remains under Armenia’s control.
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Conclusion
This paper looked at the most similar cases in the Baltics and the Caucasus and asked
the question why similar neighbours diverge on corruption levels. It teased out two
domestic elite-level factors that vary within and across the pairs: radical break with the
past and elite cohesiveness. I argued that these factors drive the variation in anti-
corruption reform in these countries. The ‘formula’ that can be derived from this paper
is that a cohesive and young group in power free from the influence of the old guard
and antagonistically predisposed towards the former colonial patron is more likely to
reform. However, it still remains to be seen whether this assertion can be generalised
through other small postcolonial states somewhere not in post-Soviet space.15
The post-Soviet experience also highlights the importance of ‘big bang.’ ‘Just do it’
said Laar in 2002, which he probably advised the same to Saakashvili after taking the
role of Georgian presidential advisor in 2006. Saakashvili encouraged the new Ukrai-
nian authorities in 2014 ‘to move fast in order to uproot the deeply rooted corruption’
(Kyiv [112]). Slow and piecemeal reform can be undermined by the spoiler trap.
However radical reform requires a willing political leadership, which may prove too
costly because it may alienate different factions of the political elite and some parts of
the population. This may also explain why big bang is rare – politicians are often not
willing to accept the cost of being voted out of office or becoming a victim to a palace
coup. The neoliberal undertone of Estonian and Georgian reforms also played a role
especially in terms of cutting red tape and eliminating low-level bribery. This goes
against the argument that the main factor influencing the incidence of corruption is
neoliberal reform itself [113]: even though the neoliberal agenda failed in Russia in the
1990s, the experience of Estonia and Georgia suggests that it can succeed if the process
is well-managed by good leadership.
The break with the past contributes in at least two important ways. First, it led to the
temporary breakdown of collusive and corrupt networks uniting leading politicians and
important businessmen. The key criticism of the applicability of the World Bank’s
corruption definition - ‘the use of public office for private gain’ - is that the distinction
between public and private often does not exist in the post-Soviet space. This article re-
affirms this assertion and also demonstrates that less influence and integration of
business elites with the ruling team in Estonia and the temporary breakdown of
powerful political-economic groupings in Georgia eliminated crucial corrupt opportu-
nity structures and facilitated reform. Second, a break with the past opened up
opportunities for the younger generation to occupy leading government positions.
Estonia and Georgia both demonstrated a high degree of break as counter-elites
prevailed in Estonia in 1992 and in Georgia in 2004. Other cases of less intense
changeover of political elites when the old guard maintained influence demonstrate
that a radical break is important. For instance in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine there was
some reshuffle of elites (since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the
Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005) but this did not lead to meaningful
change partially because reform efforts were watered down by ‘pacted transition’
or a continuing influence of the old guard [17]. The more the old guard influence,
15 Interview with the author, Shota Utiashvili, former head of analytical department, Ministry of Interior,
Tbilisi, Georgia, 17 January 2015.
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the greater the power of spoilers to keep the status-quo and undermine reforms. In
Latvia and Armenia the continuity of entrenched networks impeded reform processes.
The break with the past is related with another variable – elite cohesiveness. The two
reinforce one another – a radical break with the past was possible because the counter-
elites were cohesive and vice versa, while a cohesive political elite is an outcome of a
radical break with the past. Saakashvili’s team resembled Laar’s government – both
teams were ideologically and structurally coherent, composed of long-time friends with
roots in civil society and having a high degree of inter-personal trust. The cohesiveness
of elites results in efficient management of the reform process and well-coordinated
action to deal with related challenges in both countries. Laar and Saakashvili jumped on
the windows of opportunity provided by the transition and invested their political
power in creating well-functioning institutions.
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